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THE VIEWS OF A CHILD: EMERGING
INTERPRETATION AND SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE CHILD'S OBJECTION DEFENSE
UNDER THE HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION
CONVENTION
I. THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION AND
ADOPTION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The ever-increasing phenomenon of snatching a child
across international borders' to an unknown destination
engages deep human emotions.2 The child, involuntarily
1. Incidents of transborder parental child abduction have soared in recent
years. In 1994 alone, the United States Department of State's Office of Children's
Issues reported more than 1050 active international child abduction cases. OFFICE
OF CHILDREN'S ISSUES, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LEAFLET No. 2691, HAGUE
CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: OPER-
ATION/IMPLEMENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1994) [hereinafter OPER-
ATION/IMPLEMENTATION LEAFLET]. Statistics indicate that approximately 35 children
are abducted each month from the United States and brought across international
borders. Caroline LeGette, Note, International Child Abduction and the Hague
Convention: Emerging Practice and Interpretation of the Discretionary Exception, 25
TEX. INTL L.J. 287, 297-304 (1990) (citing Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant
Secretary, Legislative and Governmental Affairs, to Hon. James C. Wright, Jr.,
reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 525, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1988)); Eric S.
Horstmeyer, Note, The Hague Convention On the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction: An Analysis of Tahan and Viragh and Their Impact On Its
Efficacy, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 125, 125 (1995). Three factors have been
identified as contributing to this deplorable conduct. First, emerging advances in
international transportation and communications have facilitated child abduction.
Adair Dyer, Report on International Child Abduction by One Parent, in 3 ACTS
AND DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION: CHILD ABDUCTION 12, 18
(Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law ed., 1982)
[hereinafter ACTS & DOCUMENTS]. Second, binational marriages, which have
become increasingly popular, often suffer from cultural and religious friction. Philip
Schwartz, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS 1, 1 (Gloria Dehart
ed., 2d ed. 1993). Finally, the decreasing rigor of passport supervision, Dyer,
supra, at 18, and the "vulnerability of dual national children with two passports,"
Schwartz, supra, at 1, have created even greater dangers of child abduction.
2. Dyer, supra note 1, at 20; Lynda R. Herring, Comment, Taking Away the
Pawns: International Parental Abduction & The Hague Convention, 20 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 137, 138 (1994); Brenda J. Shirman, Note, International
Treatment of Child Abduction and the 1980 Hague Convention, 15 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 188 (1991); see also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing long-
term effects of abduction on the child victim).
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transformed into a pawn in the bitter divorce and custody
battles between his or her parents,3 suffers the most
destructive effects of the abduction.4 Consequently, the
abducted child, haunted by frustration, fear and "the sudden
upsetting of his [or her] stability,"5 is likely traumatized and
scarred for life.6
Inspired by the desire to minimize the devastating effects
of child abduction and to protect the interests of children7
while simultaneously struggling against the tragic increase in
international child abduction. the fourteenth session of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law9 unanimously
3. Herring, supra note 2, at 141; Dana R. Rivers, Comment, The Hague
International Child Abduction Convention and the International Child Abduction
Remedies Act: Closing Doors to the Parent Abductor, 2 TRANSNATL LAW. 589, 591
(1989). Parents who resort to child abduction often fear losing a court battle or
are dissatisfied with a custody decision. Id. The abducting parent also "hopes to
obtain a right of custody from the authorities of the country to which the child
[is] taken." Elisa P~rez-Vera, Explanatory Report, in ACTS & DOCUMENTS, supra
note 1, at 426, 429. Ms. P~rez-Vera is the official Conference reporter for the
Hague Convention. Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503 (1986). "Her explanatory
report is recognized by the Conference as the official history and commentary on
the Convention and is a source of background on the meaning of the provisions of
the Convention available to all States becoming parties to it." Id.
4. Rivers, supra note 3, at 591.
5. Dyer, supra note 1, at 21 (emphasizing that the true victim of child
abduction is the child, who "suffers from . . . the traumatic loss of contact with
the parent who has been in charge of his [or her] upbringing, [and also from] the
uncertainty and frustration which come with the necessity to adapt to a strange
language, unfamiliar cultural conditions and unknown teachers and relatives.").
6. Herring, supra note 2, at 138.
7. Elisa Prez-Vera, Report of the Special Commission, in ACTS &
DOCUMENTS, supra note 1, at 172, 182. "[Almong the most objective aspects of
[the] general interest of the child, there is the right not to be removed or retained
in the name of a more or less questionable right over his person." Id.
8. P~rez-Vera, supra note 3, at 431. The Convention also reaches the more
personal and immediate needs of left-behind parents who endure severe anguish
from being unjustifiably stripped of visitation rights with their children, and who
are often left with little or no financial resources. See Dyer, supra note 1, at 19-
20.
9. The countries present at the fourteenth session for the Hague Conference
on Private International Law were: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Surinam,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, West
Germany, and Yugoslavia. Representatives from Brazil, Hungary, Monaco, Morocco,
the Soviet Union, Uruguay, and the Vatican participated by invitation or as
observers. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct.
25, 1980, pmbl., T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4, 19 LL.M. 1501, 1501 [hereinafter Hague
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adopted the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction (Hague Convention or Convention)" on
October 24, 1980.1 The Convention is a mechanism by which
aggrieved parents may seek the immediate return' of their
abducted children. 3
This Note examines the "Child's Objection" exception'4 to
the Convention's general requirement of compulsory return. 5
The Child's Objection Clause empowers a child to voice
objections to being returned to his or her country of habitual
residence. Indeed, the essential question of the child's return
may be conclusive, provided that the child, according to the
competent authorities, has "attained an age and degree of
maturity" sufficient for his or her views to be taken into
account. 6
Convention]. Observers from the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth Secretariat,
and the International Social Service also assisted the First Commission. Perez-
Vera, supra note 3, at 426 n.1.
10. Hague Convention, supra note 9, T.IAS. No. 11,670, at 1, 19 I.L.M. at
1501. The Convention is the "final legislative step designed to impede and deter
parents from resolving family disputes concerning the care, custody, and control of
minor children by means of self-help, in violation and indifference to customary
legal or non-adversary methods of dispute resolution, usually accomplished by
fleeing to a distant state or country." Lawrence N. Stotter, History, in
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS, supra note 1, at 3, 3.
11. P~rez-Vera, supra note 3, at 426. "The Convention entered into force on
December 1, 1983, when its ratification by Canada, France and Portugal went into
effect." Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1. As of June 1995, the Contracting States of
the Hague Convention are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Belize,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark,
Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis
Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom, the United States, and one of the former
republics of Yugoslavia. OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S ISSUES, U.S. DEPT OF STATE,
LEAFLET No. 171, HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CHILD ABDUCTION: PARTY COUNTRIES AND EFFECTIVE DATES WrIH U.S. 1 (1995).
The United States became a party to the Convention on July 1, 1988.
OPERATION/IMPLEMENTATION LEAFLET, supra note 1, at 1; see Susan L. Barone,
International Child Abduction: A Global Dilemma with Limited Relief-Can
Something Be Done?, 8 N.Y. INTL L. REV. 95, 95 n.8 (1995).
12. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
13. But see infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing the
procedural prerequisites for applicability of the Hague Convention and the defenses
which an abducting parent may invoke to contest and potentially defeat a petition
for the return of a child).
14. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 13, para. 2, T.IAS. No. 11,670, at
8, 19 I.L.M. at 1502. See discussion infra Part H.B.1.
15. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
16. Prez-Vera, supra note 3, at 433; Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
Part II provides background information regarding the
Hague Convention. The first section addresses the
Convention's principal objective-to secure the return of
wrongfully abducted children-and enumerates the limited
defenses that abducting parents may invoke to contest and
perhaps defeat Hague petitions. The next section examines the
legislative history of the Child's Objection Clause and
addresses scholars' criticisms and concerns that it will be
applied arbitrarily. Part HI provides an in-depth examination
of emerging judicial interpretations of the provision by the
tribunals of the United States, England, Northern Ireland, and
Scotland. This analysis will demonstrate that, contrary to
critics' apprehensions, courts have not arbitrarily construed the
Child's Objection Clause as a basis for denying Hague petitions
for the immediate return of abducted children. Indeed, the
provision reinforces the fundamental concept underlying the
Convention: that the interests of children are of "paramount
importance." 7 This Note concludes with suggestions as to how
the Child's Objection Clause may be implemented effectively to
optimize the strength of the Convention and alleviate concerns
that the provision poses an obstacle to enforcement.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Hague Convention
The Convention's principal objective is to "secure the
prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in
any Contracting State""s under the most expeditious
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503, 10,510
(1986).
17. Hague Convention, supra note 9, pmbl., T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4, 19
I.L.M. at 1501.
18. Id. art. 1, para 1(a). Article 3 of the Convention provides that the
removal or the retention of a child is considered wrongful when: (a) it is in breach
of a parent's custody rights under the law of the state in which the child was
habitually resident prior to the removal; and (b) at the time of removal or
retention the parent was exercising those custody rights, either jointly or alone, or
would have been exercising them but for the child's removal. Id. art. 3, para. 1(a)-
(b). The Convention does not define the term "habitually resident," but
commentators suggest that the omission was intentional so as to permit courts to
interpret the phrase "without the unnecessary constraints of a standardized
meaning." Herring, supra note 2, at 152-53; see Linda Silberman, Hague
Convention on International Child Abduction: A Brief Overview and Case Law
Analysis, 28 FAM. L.Q. 9, 20-24 (1994) (discussing cases in which the identity of
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procedures possible. 9 As time is a crucial factor,"0 subject to
enumerated prerequisites"' and affimative defenses,2 the
return of a child is mandatoryY
the child's state of habitual residence was disputed).
19. See Dyer, supra note 1, at 23 ("[Tihe length of time which elapses
between the abduction and the ultimate resolution of the custody dispute has a
strong influence on the nature and the persistence of the effects on the child.").
The Explanatory Report indicates that "it is appropriate to approach the
Convention ... from a negative viewpoint, i.e., what it does not purport to
accomplish." Stotter, supra note 10, at 12. For example, the Convention is not
concerned with child custody laws, penal legislation, extradition or recognition and
enforcement of custody decisions. Id.
20. See Dyer, supra note 1, at 23.
21. For the Convention to apply, certain objective temporal qualifications must
be established. Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503, 10,509 (1986). First, article 12
requires that return proceedings be commenced within one year of the wrongful
removal or retention. See id. Also, the Convention is not retroactive. Article 35
"limits application of the Convention to wrongful removals or retentions occurring
after its entry into force between the two relevant Contracting States." Id. Finally,
under article 4, the Convention does not apply once the child attains sixteen years
of age, "regardless of when return proceedings are commenced and irrespective of
[the child's] status at the time of his or her sixteenth birthday." Id. For a
discussion of the age limitation, see infra Part 1.B.1.
22. The inclusion of defenses in the Convention "represents a compromise to
accommodate the different legal systems and tenets of family law in effect in the
countries negotiating the Convention." 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503, 10,509-10. The defenses
are also "an attempt to balance the wariness of signatories to relinquish autonomy
against their commitment to deter international parental abductions.. . ." Rivers,
supra note 3, at 624. Thus, if return proceedings are not commenced within the
statutorily prescribed period and the respondent demonstrates "that the child is
now settled in its new environment," the judicial authority of the requested State
is not obligated to direct the child's return. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art.
12, para. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 7-8, 19 I.L.M. at 1502. Pursuant to article 20,
the court need not mandate the return of a child if to do so "would not be
permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms." Id. art. 20, T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 9, 19 I.L.M. at 1503. Article 13 provides affirmative defenses which a
party opposing the child's return may invoke to defeat a petitioner's efforts. Id.
art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 8, 19 I.L.M. at 1502. See infra note 26 and
accompanying text.
23. The mandatory nature of the Convention is set forth in article 12. The
full text of article 12 provides:
Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms
of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings
before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State
where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the
date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall
order the return of the child forthwith.
The judicial or administrative authority, even where the
proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of
BROOK. J. INTL L.
Although the Convention proved to be an effective weapon
in the struggle against international child abduction,24 family
law scholars and practitioners have criticized the Convention
because under courts are not obligated absolutely to order a
child's return under its provisions.'
Specifically, article 13 of the Convention enumerates three
defenses which the abducting parent may invoke potentially to
defeat a petition for the return of a child:
[T]he judicial or administrative authority of the requested
State [reviewing a Hague petition] is not bound to order the
return of the child if the person... [who] opposes [his or her]
return establishes that -
a the person... having the care of the person of the child
was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of
removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently
acquiesced in the removal or retention; or
b there is a grave risk that [the child's] return would expose
the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place
the child in an intolerable situation.
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse
to order the return of the child if it finds that the child
objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree
of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of [his
or her] views."
one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the
return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now
settled in its new environment.
Where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested
State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another
State, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the
return of the child.
Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 7-8, 19 I.L.M. at
1502 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the article 12 provisions, see Thomas
0. Harper, IU, Comment, The Limitations of the Hague Convention and Alternative
Remedies For a Parent Including Re-Abduction, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 257, 263
(1995) (discussing the exception to the one-year statute of limitations and noting
that "[sihowing that the child has settled into a new environment ... leaves vast
opportunities for discretion.... A judge could use many subjective criteria to
make this determination.").
24. Herring, supra note 2, at 174.
25. See, e.g., Rivers, supra note 3, at 620-21; Legal Analysis of the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg.
10,503, 10,509 (1986).
26. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 13, para. 1(a)-(b), T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 8, 19 I.L.M. at 1502. For a discussion of the paragraph 1(a) defense to
mandatory return of a child, see Herring, supra note 2, at 166-67; PNrez-Vera,
442 [Vol. MXI:2
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If the abducting parent establishes any one of the three
defenses to the court's satisfaction, the court may, in its discre-
tion, refuse to order the return of the child to his or her coun-
try of habitual residence.
B. Child's Objection Clause
1. Legislative History
The legislative history of the Child's Objection Clause
indicates that the provision must be examined in conjunction
with the specified age limit for application of the Conven-
tion.27 Because the Convention applies ratione personae' to all
children under the age of sixteen,29 the inclusion of the Child's
Objection Clause represents a compromise of two significant
competing interests-the desire to expand the scope and ap-
plication of the Convention versus the situation of children
under sixteen who have the right to choose their own place of
supra note 3, at 460-61. The legislative history of the paragraph 1(a) defense is
provided in the P~rez-Vera Report. Id. at 432-33. For an in-depth examination of
the paragraph 1(b) defense, see LeGette, supra note 1, at 297-304 (analyzing
judicial interpretations of the paragraph 1(b) defense in the United States,
Australia, England, and Scotland); Horstmeyer, supra note 1, at 127 ("The cases
analyzing Article 13b reflect a tension between the traditional child's best interests
analysis, which applies to custody hearings, and the Convention's desired approach,
which mandates the immediate return of a wrongfully removed child without
addressing the parents' conflicting claims."). The "grave risk of harm" exception is
the Convention's most litigated provision, id., because it "creates the largest
amount of judicial discretion." Harper, supra note 23, at 259.
27. Pdrez-Vera, supra note 3, at 450.
28. Id. at 433. Black's Law Dictionary provides the following definition for the
term "ratione personae": "By reason of the person concerned; from the character of
the person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1263 (6th ed. 1990).
29. Pdrez-Vera, supra note 3, at 433. Consequently, no action may be taken
based upon the Convention, with regard to a child after his or her sixteenth birth-
day. Id. at 450. Because "the child's age is of great significance in determining the
effects [of) an abduction," Dyer, supra note 1, at 24, the age issue was an impor-
tant consideration and the subject of considerable attention during the preliminary
stages of the Convention. Pdrez-Vera, supra note 7, at 184, 193; see also Conclu-
sions Drawn from the Discussions of the Special Commission of March 1979 on
Legal Kidnapping, in ACTS & DOCUMENTS, supra note 1, at 162, 165 [hereinafter
Conclusions] (noting that the age limit "might be set lower."). The drafters estab-
lished the age limit at sixteen years acknowledging that a child over sixteen "has
in general a will of [his or her] own which cannot be ignored by either of the
parents." P6rez-Vera, supra note 7, at 184. This holds true "even if [the child] has
not reached the age of full legal capacity under the internal law of [his or her]
nationality or of the State of [his or her] habitual residence." Id.
BROOK. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XXII:2
residence.0
To reconcile these competing interests, the drafters con-
cluded, albeit apprehensively,3' that a reservation enabling
courts to consider the views of the child was "absolutely neces-
sary."5 2 However, all efforts to agree on a minimum age at
which to consider the views of the child failed,33 and as a re-
sult, the drafters were unanimous in bestowing discretion in
the application of the Child's Objection Clause to the compe-
tent authorities.' Accordingly, whenever a tribunal confronts
the possibility of returning a child legally entitled to decide his
or her place of residence, the Convention permits the judge to
decide whether the child's opinion should be the decisive fac-
tor.3 The drafters concluded that granting judicial discretion
was preferable to a lowering of the overall age which would
reduce the Convention's scope.36
30. See Perez-Vera, supra note 3, at 450. Legislation in a number of countries
requires that the child be heard, to the fullest extent possible, prior to a determi-
nation of custody. Dyer, supra note 1, at 24 (citing article 167 of the Netherlands
Civil Code). Although "[tlhe general trend is towards greater emphasis on the
child's consent," id., the drafters rejected an outright proposal in part because the
child's right to choose his or her residence is an intricate part of the right to
custody. Prez-Vera, supra note 3, at 450.
31. The drafters recognized that the stipulation essentially grants a child "the
possibility of interpreting [his or her] own interests." P6rez-Vera, supra note 3, at
433. Furthermore, "this provision could prove dangerous if it were implemented by
means of the direct questioning of young people who may admittedly have a clear
grasp of the situation but who may also suffer serious psychological harm if they
think they are being forced to choose between two parents." Id.
32. Id. (recognizing the difficulty of accepting that a child, for example, a 15-
year old, should be returned against his or her will); see also Perez-Vera, supra
note 7, at 193; Conclusions, supra note 29, at 164. Initially, the Convention draft-
ers recommended an overall age limit of 14. This would have eliminated the need
for the Child's Objection Clause and would have also provided children with lee-
way so that they would have enough insight and understanding to comprehend the
consequences of a change of residence. See Comments of the Governments on Pre-
liminary Document No. 6, in ACTS & DOCUMENTS, supra note 1, at 215, 215. How-
ever, the Assembly opted to preserve the Child's Objection Clause.
33. Pdrez-Vera, supra note 3, at 433 ("[A1ll the ages suggested seemed arti-
ficial, even arbitrary."). The Special Commission rejected a proposal which would
have required that the opinions of children over 12 be taken into account. Perez-
Vera, supra note 7, at 204.
34. Pdrez-Vera, supra note 3, at 433. When the Child's Objection Clause was
presented, no delegation objected to the proposed formulation of the defense.
Prodls-verbal No. 16, in ACTS & DOCUMENTS, supra note 1, at 363, 366 (comments
of the Chairman).
35. P~rez-Vera, supra note 3, at 450.
36. Id. at 450; P~rez-Vera, supra note 7, at 184. Indeed, recent efforts of the
Special Commission to standardize the age limit at which it is appropriate for a
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Nevertheless, because the Convention fails to specify a
threshold age at which it is appropriate for the authorities to
consider the child's views, it invites potential subjective and
arbitrary decision making. The inherent, discretionary nature
of the Child's Objection Clause is aggravated further by the
Convention's failure to delineate objective criteria for the
courts to assess when exercising discretion. Thus, judicial dis-
cretion is twofold: first, the court must determine whether or
not to consider a child's views; and second, based on the court's
perception, whether or not to order the child's return.
The Convention does, however, offer some guidance when
an article 13 defense 7 is asserted. Perhaps the most significant
consideration for a court to assess is that the mere assertion of
an aTirmative defense by the abducting parent does not limit
the court's power to order the return of the child at any time.s
Indeed, even when more than one defense is established, the
court may order the child's immediate return, although the
Convention does not mandate return.39
In addition, pursuant to paragraph 3 of article 13, the
court must consider information relating to the child's social
background,40 provided by the Central Authority4' or other
court to take into account the child's views also proved futile. Report of the Sec-
ond Special Commission Meeting to Review the Operation of the Hague Conven-
tion on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Jan. 18-21, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 225, 242 (response to Question 23).
37. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
38. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 18, T.IA.S. No. 11,670, at 9, 19
I.L.M. at 1503. "A child's objection to being returned may be accorded little if any
weight if the court believes that the child's preference is the product of the abduc-
tor parent's undue influence over the child." Legal Analysis of the Hague Conven-
tion on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503,
10,510 (1986).
39. See Peter H. Pfund, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduc-
tion, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, and the Need for Availability
of Counsel for All Petitioners, 24 FAM. L.Q. 35, 40 (1990).
40. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 13, para. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at
8, 19 I.L.M. at 1502. This requirement serves a dual purpose: it ensures "that the
court has a balanced record upon which to determine whether the child is to be
returned" when an objection is asserted, and it "prevent[s] the abductor from ob-
taining an unfair advantage through his or her own forum selection with resulting
ready access to evidence of the child's living conditions in that forum." Legal Anal-
ysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduc-
tion, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503, 10,510 (1986).
41. Each state that ratifies the Convention is obligated to establish a "Central
Authority" which carries out two primary functions. First, a Central Authority
receives and transmits petitions for the return of children to the Central Authori-
BROOK. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XXII:2
competent agency of the child's habitual residence, "to verify
the existence of the circumstances which form the bases of the
article 13 defenses to the child's return."42 Finally, in inter-
preting the article 13 defenses, the tribunals must always ac-
knowledge that a restrictive interpretation is required in order
to avoid a hearing on the merits of the underlying custody dis-
pute and to prevent the Convention from becoming a dead
letter."
2. Criticism of the Child's Objection Defense
Family law scholars and practitioners criticize several
aspects of the Child's Objection defense. First, scholars main-
tain that the provision contravenes article 19 of the Conven-
tion45 by enabling a tribunal to determine the merits of a custo-
dy dispute rather than leaving this resolution to the courts of
ties of other contracting states. Second, a Central Authority attempts to locate
children alleged to have been wrongfully removed from or retained in their coun-
try of origin, and to investigate their well-being. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1.
Articles 7 through 11 of the Convention discuss the creation and obligations of the
Central Authority. Hague Convention, supra note 9, arts. 7-11, T.IA.S. No. 11,670,
at 5-7, 19 I.L.M. at 1501-02. For the official history of the Central Authority, see
P~rez-Vera, supra note 3, at 437-39. In the United States, the designated Central
Authority is the Department of State's Office of Children's Issues. OPERA-
TIONIMPLEMENTATION LEAFLET, supra note 1, at 1. For an in-depth examination of
the operations of the Central Authority, see Carol S. Bruch, The Central
Authority's Role Under the Hague Child Abduction Convention: A Friend in Deed,
28 FAM. L.Q. 35 (1994).
42. See Prez-Vera, supra note 7, at 205.
43. Significant to the Convention's principal goal is the requirement that a
decision rendered pursuant to the Convention must not resolve any issue relevant
to a parent's custody of the child. Article 19 provides that "[a] decision under this
Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determi-
nation on the merits of any custody issue." Hague Convention, supra note 9, art.
19, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 9, 19 I.L.M. at 1503; see Dyer, supra note 1, at 48; see
also P6rez-Vera, supra note 3, at 430 ("[Ihe Convention rests implicitly upon the
principle that any debate on the merits ... of custody rights should take place
before the competent authorities in the State where the child had its habitual
residence prior to its removal .... ."). Once the child returns and the status quo
is restored, litigation concerning custody or visitation issues may proceed in the
child's state of habitual residence. Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503, 10,511 (1986).
44. P6rez-Vera, supra note 3, at 434. Moreover, "[Slystematic invocation of
the . . . exceptions, substituting the forum chosen by the abductor for that of the
child's residence, would lead to the collapse of the whole structure of the Conven-
tion by depriving it of the spirit of mutual confidence which is its inspiration." Id.
at 435.
45. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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the child's country of habitual residence.46 Second, it is argued,
if the exception is construed too liberally, the child and not the
judge would, in effect, be making a return determination.47
This concern is exaggerated by the apprehension that a child's
objection to being returned potentially may be the product of
"brainwashing" by the abducting parent." The third and harsh-
est criticism of the Child's Objection Clause is the contention
that the provision is susceptible to judicial abuse49 because it
grants broad discretion 0 to a tribunal reviewing a Hague peti-
tion. Because the Convention fails to specify a threshold age,
the judge may decide subjectively whether the child is mature
enough to be choosing the abducting parent over the aggrieved
parent.5' Also, judges may employ partial tactics and bias when
deciding how much deference to accord a child's emotional,
materialistic or educational preferences. 2 For instance, the
abducting parent asserting the defense may be a national of
the requested State and, as a result, might receive favored
treatment by the court. Moreover, a judge deciding whether to
order the child's return may be tempted to favor the social
conditions or cultural lifestyle in the requested State. These
possibilities blur the already obscure divide at which the
child's preference should take precedence over that of the judge
and the aggrieved parent.53 This inherent subjectivity may lead
to inconsistent application and arbitrary interpretation of the
Convention.
To avoid this potential for judicial abuse, one author,
46. See Shirman, supra note 2, at 219 ("[Ihe court in the state of the child's
habitual residence is better suited to hear the child's views and to weigh them
along with other considerations.").
47. Rivers, supra note 3, at 627; see also Harper, supra note 23, at 262-63
(examining cases where courts considered the child's views in reaching their deter-
mination of whether or not to order the return of the child).
48. Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503, 10,510 (1986); see Rivers, supra note
3, at 627.
49. Lynn A. Starr, Recent Development, United States Implementation of the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 24 STAN.
J. INTL L. 289, 299 (1987); Harper, supra note 23, at 262; Rivers, supra note 3,
at 624.
50. Starr, supra note 49, at 298; see Harper, supra note 23, at 262; Rivers,
supra note 3, at 625.
51. Harper, supra note 23, at 262.
52. See Rivers, supra note 3, at 627.
53. Id.
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Brenda J. Shirman, advocates the complete elimination of the
Child's Objection defense from the text of the Convention. 4
This proposal rests primarily on two assumptions. First, Ms.
Shirman presumes that any deference to the child's wishes
would have been made during the initial custody disputes on
the merits.55 Second, she asserts that if there has not been a
hearing on the merits, the courts in the state of the child's
habitual residence are better suited to hear the child's views
and weigh them along with other considerations. 6 While the
concerns expressed are valid, they presuppose that the munici-
pal laws of the child's state of habitual residence authorize a
court to consider the child's convictions in a custody proceed-
ing. Unfortunately, not all countries' laws do so." In any event,
an analysis of decisions interpreting the Child's Objection
Clause reveals that inquiry into a child's views can be accom-
plished without necessarily transforming the Hague proceeding
into a substantive custody hearing.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The emerging judicial interpretation of the Child's Objec-
tion Clause discussed in this section indicates that in most
instances, courts have not interpreted the provision subjective-
ly or arbitrarily, and generally, interpretation of the provision
is consistent. Indeed, although the case law that follows illus-
trates judicial willingness to display a heightened sensitivity
toward children's views, there is a demonstrated disinclination
by tribunals to defer to the child's objection as a basis for deny-
ing a Hague petition.
A. United States
Although not specifically interpreting the Child's Objection
Clause, U.S. courts address issues concerning the child's views
within the framework of the "grave risk of harm" exception
54. Shirman, supra note 2, at 219 ("The exception permitting deference to the
child's wishes should be eliminated from the Convention" to ensure "the positive
affect [sic] of removing the possibilities of undue influence by an abducting par-
ent.").
55. Id.
56. Id. This conclusion is consistent with article 19 as well as the primary
objective of the Convention. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
57. See Dyer, supra note 1, at 24.
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embodied in paragraph 1(b) of article 13.5" In Sheikh v.
Cahill,59 the child's mother filed a Hague petition for the re-
turn of her nine-year-old son, Nadeem, to England after the
child's father wrongfully retained the child at the end of a
summer visit in the United States. The father, invoking two of
the article 13 defenses, opposed the petition,"0 contending first,
that there was a grave risk that the child's return to England
would expose him to physical and psychological harm,6 and
second, that the child objected to being returned. 2
After conducting an in camera interview of the child, the
New York State Supreme Court of Kings County refused to
utilize article 13 as a basis for retaining the abducted child in
the United States.'c The court concluded that the evidence did
not support a finding that return of the child created a risk of
harm sufficient to warrant application of paragraph 1(b) of
article 13. 4 Further, the court stated that although the child
expressed a preference to remain in the United States, his
desire was likely the reaction of being wooed by his father
during a summer vacation.65 As a result, the court concluded
that the child was not sufficiently mature to warrant consider-
ation of his views so as to avoid return.6
Similarly, in Navarro v. Bullock,67 the custodial father of
two children commenced Hague proceedings in the California
Superior Court seeking the children's return to Spain after
58. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
59. 145 Misc. 2d 171, 546 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1989).
60. Id. at 177, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
61. Id.
62. Sheikh, 145 Misc. 2d at 177, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
63. Id. at 177, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 521-22.
64. Id. at 177, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 521. In the United States, a finding that a
paragraph 1(b) "grave risk of harm" exception exists must be based upon clear
and convincing evidence. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 4(e)(2)(A),
42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A) (1994). Although the Hague Convention was self-execut-
ing in form, and thus required no federal implementing legislation to bring it into
force, Congress enacted the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA)
"to fit this unique treaty smoothly into our legal system." Pfund, supra note 39, at
42. ICARA "deals with questions of jurisdiction, burden of proof, costs and fees,
admissibility of documents, and locating and assisting an abducted child in the
United States." Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1-2. ICARA was enacted in 1988.
Stotter, supra note 10, at 15.
65. Sheikh, 145 Misc. 2d at 177, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
66. Id. at 177, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 521-22.
67. 15 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 1576 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1989).
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their mother refused to return them at the end of a visitation
period. On the basis of the testimony of the abducted children
and the court-appointed psychiatrist, the court noted that the
children were confused and determined that the children's
reluctance to return to their father in Spain was a consequence
of their mother's actions.6" The court concluded that the evi-
dence adduced failed to support the abducting parent's claim
that the requirements of paragraph 1(b) of article 13 were
met.69
B. England
The English courts furnish the most extensive analysis of
the Child's Objection Clause. In In re R,70 the court concluded
that before a court may consider exercising discretion, the child
must express more than a mere preference for remaining in a
particular country, and declared that "[t]he word 'objects' im-
ports a strength of feeling which goes far beyond the usual
ascertainment of the wishes of the child in a custody dis-
pute."71 Although this textual interpretation of the word "ob-
jects" was subsequently overturned by the court in In re S,7"
the prominent case involving the Child's Objection defense,
other English courts still require a manifestation of behavior
demonstrating a heightened objection by the child.73
In re S consummated the marathon litigation between the
French father and English mother of a nine-year-old girl with
long-standing psychological problems.74 After the parents' di-
vorce, the parties agreed that the mother and child would live
in Paris and that the father would pay maintenance and have
68. Id. at 1577.
69. Id.
70. [1992] 1 Fan. 105 (Eng. Faro. Div. 1991).
71. Id. at 108.
72. [1993] 2 All E.R. 683, 690 (CA. 1992), Mffg S v. S, [1992] 2 Faro. 31
(Eng. Faro. Div.). The case represents an appeal from an order of the lower court,
Family Division, dismissing the father's application for the child's return under the
Hague Convention. See S v. S, [1992] 2 Farn. at 31.
73. See, e.g., In re M, [19941 1 Faro. 390, 395-96 (Eng. CA. 1993).
74. In re S, [19931 2 All E.R. at 683. The opinion indicates that the problems
manifested themselves in speech difficulties and behavioral problems resulting from
frequent relocation and language confusion. Id. Neurologists and psychologists ad-




unimpeded access to the child.75 Claiming she feared violence
and cessation of payments by the father, the mother brought
the child to England.7" Thereafter, the father commenced
Hague proceedings in the Family Division of England77 seek-
ing the girl's return to France, which the mother opposed on
two of the three article 13 grounds: the "grave risk of harm"
defense78 and the Child's Objection defense.7"
During the Family Division proceedings, the judge did not
interview the child.8" Instead, a court-appointed welfare offi-
cer examined her and presented the court with an oral re-
port.8' The welfare officer's testimony indicated that the child,
who dreaded returning to France, represented an impassioned
view which was not influenced by the abducting mother, and
that although the child was very emotionally fragile, intellectu-
ally she was mature enough to comprehend her situation. 2
Based upon this testimony, the Family Division refused to
order the child's return.'
The Court of Appeal affirmed the Family Division's order
and declared that the exceptional circumstances required for a
court to refuse to order the immediate return of a child who
has been wrongfully removed were established." In its analy-
sis of the Child's Objection Clause, the court enunciated the
facts "necessary to open the door" under paragraph 2 of article
13.' The court emphasized two procedural points. First, while
noting that the Convention is designed to secure a speedy
return to the country from which the child has been abduc-
75. Id. at 686.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 686. The parties conceded that the child's habitual residence was in
France. See id. at 685-86.
78. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 13, para. 1(b), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at
8, 19 I.L.M. at 1502; see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
79. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 13, para. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at
8, 19 I.L.M. at 1502; see In re S, [1993] 2 All E.R. at 686.
80. S v. S, [1992] 2 Faro. 31, 36 (Eng. Faro. Div.).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. The father subsequently appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal,
Civil Division. See In re S, [1993] 2 All E.R. at 683.
84. In re S, [1993] 2 All E.R. at 692.
85. Id. at 690. First, the court rejected the construction of the word "objects"
set forth by the court in In re R. Id.; see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying
text.
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ted,s6 the court announced that the questions of whether a
child objects to being returned and has attained an age and
degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to consider his or
her views are questions of fact within the province of the Fam-
ily Division judge. Second, the court emphasized that even if
the abducted child asserts a valid objection to returning to his
or her country of habitual residence, the court is not prevented
from ordering the child's return. 7 By reiterating this essen-
tial power, which underlies the existence of the article 13 de-
fenses, the court reminded other tribunals that courts are
never prohibited from returning the child.
In deciding how much deference to give the child's views,
the In re S court's focus on the source of the child's objection
provides lower courts with substantial guidance.' If the lower
court concludes that the child's views are influenced by some
other person, such as the abducting parent, or that the objec-
tion to being returned is that the child wishes to remain with
the abducting parent, then little or no weight should be given
to the child's views. 9 Conversely, if the lower court finds that
the child has valid reasons for his or her objection, then it may
refuse to mandate return.'
Perhaps the most significant portion of In re S was the
court's differentiation between the "grave risk of harm" and
Child's Objection defenses. The court concluded that the con-
struction of article 13 demanded a strict interpretation where-
in the two defenses are distinct and considered separately.91
86. In re S, [1993] 2 All E.R. at 690.
87. See id. at 691.
88. Specifically, the court stated:
It will usually be necessary for the judge to find out why the child ob-
jects to being returned. If the only reason is because [he or she] wants
to remain with the abducting parent, who is also asserting that he or
she is unwilling to return, then this will be a highly relevant factor
when the judge comes to consider the exercise of discretion.
Id. at 690-91.
89. Id. at 691.
90. Id. Because the Convention does not specify a minimum age under which
a court may not consider the child's objection, the Court of Appeal refused to
enumerate an age. Id.
91. Id. at 690. The court declared:
It will be seen that the part of [article] 13 which relates to the
child's objections to being returned is completely separate from [para-
graph 1(b) of article 13], and we can see no reason to interpret this part
of the article, as we were invited to do by [counsel], as importing a re-
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Specifically, refusal pursuant to paragraph 2 of article 13 to
grant the child's wishes to stay in the country to which it has
been abducted may not be the cause for the psychological harm
contemplated by paragraph 1(b) of article 13.92
Finally, the Court of Appeal justified the Family Division's
inquiry into the child's views by noting the relevance and sig-
nificance of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child.3 Article 12 of this convention confers upon a child
the right to express his or her views,' providing that:
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of
forming his or her own views the right to express those views
freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child
being given due weight in accordance with the age and matu-
rity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided
the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administra-
quirement to establish a grave risk that the return of the child would
expose her to psychological harm, or otherwise place her in an intolerable
situation.
Id.
92. Id. A liberal construction of article 13 would enable an abducting parent
to intermingle the various defenses. Arguably, then, the existence of a particular
defense would supply the foundation for another. For example, an abducting par-
ent could argue as follows: By denying the child's wish to stay despite paragraph
2, forcing her to return against her will to the country of habitual residence, the
court would be placing the child in grave risk of psychological harm, and thus
exposing her to an intolerable situation under paragraph 1(b). This "piling on" of
defenses will likely result in inaccurate portrayals of the child's mental and emo-
tional health and also of her life in the country of habitual residence. Consequent-
ly, a court may be deceived into believing that because all the exceptions have
been "established," preventing the child's return would be justified. On the other
hand, the In re S court's strict textual interpretation of article 13, requiring that
the defenses be distinct from one another and that they be proved individually,
serves as one method of ensuring that abducting parents are not overstating the
child's situation.
93. Id. at 691; see Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 61st plen. mtg., Agenda Item 108, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/736 (1989) [hereinafter U.N. Convention]. Other courts have also utilized
the U.N. Convention to justify considering the child's views. See In re M, [1994] 1
Farn. 390, 395 (Eng. Fain. Div. 1993) (a court's refusal to interview a child would
"fail to take into account [article] 12 of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child 1989").
94. "The Convention on the Rights of the Child is a unique human rights
treaty in that it protects not only the child's civil and political rights but that it
also extends protection to the child's economic, social and cultural rights and hu-
manitarian rights." Cynthia P. Cohen, Introductory Note to United Nations: Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1448 (1989).
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tive proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or
through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner
consistent with the procedural rules of national law.95
Based upon a review of the Family Division record and an
examination of the whole circumstances of the child's life, the
Court of Appeal determined that the Family Division had suffi-
cient evidence before it to conclude that the child was intelli-
gent and capable of conveying a rational, cogent, and mature
view of her situation based on genuine concerns. Accordingly,
the Court of Appeal affirmed the Family Division's order refus-
ing to order the child's return. 6
C. Scotland
In Urness v. Minto,97 the Scottish Court of Session re-
fused to order the return of two children, John, age twelve, and
his nine-year-old brother Kevin, to the United States after it
agreed with the lower court that to return one sibling, whose
views were not mature enough to warrant consideration, to the
country of habitual residence effectively would expose the older
sibling, whose views were deemed mature, to an intolerable
situation."
The parents, John Arthur Urness (an American) and Jac-
queline McDonald Minto (a native Scot) initiated divorce pro-
ceedings after two unsuccessful attempts to salvage their mar-
riage.9 Although the California courts awarded custody of
John and Kevin Urness to their father, Mrs. Minto subsequent-
ly removed the children to Scotland.' Mrs. Minto opposed
Mr. Urness' Hague petition seeking the return of the two chil-
dren to the United States, on the grounds, inter alia, that the
children objected to being returned'0 ' and that there was a
95. U.N. Convention, supra note 93, art. 12, at 8.
96. In re S, [1993] 2 All E.R. 683, 692 (C.A. 1992).
97. 1994 Scots L.T.R. 996 (2d Div. 1993), affg In re Urness, 1994 Scots L.T.R.
989 (1993) (Penrose, Lord Ordinary).
98. Urness v. Minto, 1994 Scots L.T.R. at 999.
99. In re Urness, 1993 Scots L.T.R. at 990.
100. Id. Lord Penrose, the Lord Ordinary reviewing the petition, determined
that Mrs. Minto deliberately and intentionally abducted the children to Scotland,
intending to deny Mr. Urness contact with them. Id. at 991.
101. The children's objection to being returned to the United States was the
most substantial issue in this case. Id. at 993.
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grave risk that the older child would suffer psychological harm
if he was forced to remain in Scotland without his mother and
younger brother. °2
During the initial proceedings, the judge heard evidence
from the children in open court as well as oral and written
evidence from a psychologist.' Based upon its assessment of
the children's demeanor and statements, the court determined
that the views of the older child, John, should be accorded
significant deference based upon the genuine and heartfelt
character of his objection to returning.' However, the court
took a different view of the objections of the younger son,
Kevin, noting that Kevin's assessment of his position and ex-
pression of his views were less reliable than those of John.' °
Although the court found that Kevin reflected, to a far greater
extent than John, the influences of family discussion, the court
was convinced that there was no attempt to coach or influence
Kevin in the objections he advanced.' Conversely, the psy-
chologist who examined Kevin admitted that the child's views
were very much influenced by lack of knowledge and uncer-
tainty as to the situation in which he would be placed should
he be returned to the United States.0 7 Based on this conflict-
ing evidence, the court made dissimilar findings with respect
to each child's maturity level and the veracity of their views.
Nevertheless, despite these disparate conclusions, the
court reasoned that to order Kevin's return to the United
States over his objection, while allowing John to remain in
Scotland, would create an intolerable situation that would
102. See id. at 991; see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
103. In re Urness, 1994 Scots L.T.R. at 991.
104. Id. at 994. Based on John's well-adjusted appearance, intelligence, and
acceptance of the formal judicial structure, the court concluded that the child was
"relatively mature." Id. The court noted that the only difficulty John encountered
during the court examination was when he was pressed on the question of his
objection to returning to America coupled with the possibility that, despite his
views, he might be ordered to return. Id. "The implied threat that the court might
override his wishes was the only factor that undermined [John's] self-control
throughout the proceedings." Id. Additionally, the court indicated that John consid-
ered and formed a firm view that his attachment to his stepfather and mother
should have priority over contact with his father. Id.
105. Id. ("[Kevin] was inclined to be more openly critical of [his father] and to
express his disinclination to be associated with him in terms of his recollection of
experiences of visitation in the past.").
106. Id.
107. Id. at 995.
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inevitably produce extreme distress and difficulty for both
Kevin and Mrs. Minto.'0° As a result of its determination, the
court refused to order the return of either child."0 9
In In re Matznick,"° the Scottish court considered the
wishes of an eleven-year-old boy, Daniel, and his nine-year-old
sister, Lisa Marie, but despite their objections, ordered that
the children immediately be returned to the United States."'
In ascertaining the children's views, the court proceeded with
an in camera interview of both children."' Relying on the
children's testimony, the court found that the children were
satisfied with their lives in the United States, they were well-
settled in school, and enjoyed the company of many
friends."' Indeed, the court deduced that the children's objec-
tions to being returned to the United States had little to do
with their dislike of the country."4 Instead, the court realized
that the only basis for the children's objections to returning
was the haunting fear that their mother would remain in Scot-
land." 5 These apprehensions, however, quickly disappeared
with the mother's willingness to accompany the children to the
United States if the court ordered their return.' Because
the court concluded that there was no merit to the children's
objections, it ordered their immediate return. 17
108. Id. The court was concerned that Mrs. Minto would have been faced with
a choice that she had never contemplated-staying in Scotland with John or re-
turning to the United States with Kevin. Id
109. Id. at 996. The appellate court upheld the decision, concluding that there
was sufficient evidence of a grave risk of harm to both children. Urness v. Minto,
1994 Scots L.T.R. (2d Div. 1993).
110. 1995 Sess. Cas. (Outer House Nov. 9, 1994) (LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
Scocas File) (Cameron, Lord Ordinary).
111. Id. at screen 32. In response to the father's Hague petition, the mother
opposed the children's return on the "grave risk of harm" exception as well as the
Child's Objection Clause. The court dismissed the mother's first defense, concluding
that she had grossly exaggerated allegations of physical violence against her by
her husband. Id. at screens 15-20.
112. See id. at screens 20-22.








Foster v. Foster". involved a father's petition for the re-
turn of his three children-Jeffrey, age twelve, Jason, age
eleven, and Sean, age one-to Australia from Northern Ire-
land, where they were wrongfully removed by their moth-
er."' Here, too, the children's mother defended the petition
on two article 13 grounds, claiming that return of the children
would expose them to a "grave risk of harm" and that the chil-
dren objected to returning to Australia."
In contrast with the children's objections in other cases,
the Foster children protested return to Australia because of
the hot climate, intense sunlight, and high incidence of skin
cancer.'2' The Family Division's in camera interview revealed
that the Foster children suffered from a hereditary disease
that exposed them to a great risk of developing malignant
melanoma cancer.' As a result of their physical condition,
the children were forced to remain indoors during the hottest
months of the year (their vacation period from school), they
had to apply protective sunscreen continuously whenever they
exposed their skin to sun, and they constantly were required to
wear hooded caps, long shorts, and long-sleeved T-shirts.' If
the children forgot to bring sunscreen to school, they were not
permitted to play outside with their classmates during re-
cess. =
4
Aside from the medical and social arguments asserted, the
Family Division's in camera interview revealed the more per-
sonal reasons underlying the Foster children's objections to
returning to Australia. Although Jeffrey asserted that he pre-
118. 1993 N. Ir. (Fam. Div. May 24, 1993) (LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Nircas File)
(Higgins, J.).
119. Id. at screens 1-2. The social worker reported that the children's mother
went to Ireland to prevent the children from having unsupervised interactions with
their father. Id. at screen 7.
120. Id. at screen 11.
121. See id. at screens 14-19.
122. The children suffered from Dysplastic Naevus Syndrome, a hereditary
disorder in which family members have multiple irregularly shaped and pigmented
naevi (moles), and had a positive history of melanoma, "a dangerous and aggres-
sive form of skin cancer which has a high mortality rate." Id. at screen 15.
123. Id. at screen 17.
124. Id. On previous occasions, the children suffered severe episodes of blis-
tering sunburn, although five-and-a-half years had elapsed from the last such
episode. Id. at screens 17-18.
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ferred Ireland because of the cool climate and because he had
many friends and was happy in school," he admitted that he
did not want to return to Australia because he had no desire to
resume contact with his father, whom he did not like. Jason
revealed similar reasons for wanting to remain in Ireland and
also expressed his preference to remain with his mother, al-
though he claimed he did not mind if his father visited.126
The psychologist who examined the children reported that the
children deliberately repressed feelings, thoughts, and memo-
ries about some of the aspects of contact with their father
which they found depressing or unpleasant. 7
Relying upon the evidence adduced, the court made specif-
ic findings that the children objected to returning on the
grounds that: (1) they did not wish to have contact with their
father; (2) they disliked the Australian climate and the contin-
uing need to apply sunscreen; and (3) they preferred to remain
in Northern Ireland with their mother. 28 Considering the
children's testimony, the court concluded that Jeffrey's views
were sufficiently mature to be considered seriously by the court
and, although Jason was less mature, he was not less well in-
formed and thus, his views should also be taken seriously.'29
Following the lead of the In re S court,3 ' the Foster court
determined that the children should be returned to Australia
despite their legitimate objections.'3' In reaching its conclu-
sion, the court balanced the various considerations adverse to
the children's return against the considerations supporting
their return.3 2 Nevertheless, the court was not persuaded that
Jeffrey and Jason possessed all the information necessary to
make a balanced and informed decision about returning to
Australia.33 Particularly, the court articulated that the
children's desire to sever contact with their father was not an
adequate objection, partially because even if they were ordered
returned, in Australia they would remain in their mother's
125. Id. at screen 36.
126. Id. at screen 36-37.
127. Id. at 37.
128. Id. at screen 50.
129. Id. at screen 38.
130. See supra notes 72-96 and accompanying text.
131. Foster, 1993 N. Ir. at screens 59-60.
132. Id. at screens 54-59.
133. Id. at screen 52.
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custody and the father would not have visitation rights unless
and until an Australian court so ordered.' Next, the judge
determined that the children's dislike and intolerance of the
Australian climate was a substantial and legitimate com-
plaint."5 Finally, the court accorded no weight to the
children's preference to stay in Northern Ireland with their
mother because "children are inclined to be supportive of the
parent who had care and custody of them."'36
Having weighed these various considerations, the court
emphasized that it was in the "best interests" of the children to
be returned to Australia where the appropriate Family Court
of Western Australia could make the long-term decisions as to
the children's future.3 7
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS' INTERPRETATION
A court's thoughtful and thorough analysis of testimonial,
sociological and other evidence, coupled with a narrow inter-
pretation of the Child's Objection Clause, can assist in promot-
ing stable familial relationships and reducing psychological
trauma which results when parents abruptly uproot children
and remove them to foreign lands.' 8 The decisions of the
English courts, especially the Court of Appeal's In re S deci-
sion," enumerate useful precedent for future litigation in-
volving the Child's Objection defense. The opinions tend to
maintain the narrow interpretation of the Child's Objection de-
fense as contemplated and encouraged by the framers of the
Convention. Furthermore, the Court's strict textual construc-
tion of article 13 requires an abducting parent to establish
independently the existence and validity of alleged defenses to
the mandatory return of the child.4 As a result, the decision
may ensure an accurate portrayal of the child's situation in his
134. Id. at screen 50.
135. Id. at screens 51, 55-56.
136. Id. at screen 52.
137. Id. at screen 59. The court emphasized the importance "for the sake of
the children that the parents. . . not delay in applying to that Court so that
those decisions [could] be reached as soon as possible." Id.
138. Horstmeyer, supra note 1, at 141.
139. [1993] 2 All E.R. 683 (C.A. 1992), affg S v. S, [19921 2 Farn. 31 (Eng.
Fain. Div.); see supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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or her country of habitual residence.' The most profound
development of the English courts, however, is that while
courts are urged to abstain from hearing substantive issues
that should be reserved for custody determinations, they afford
a child capable of forming a mature opinion the right to be
heard.
Similarly, U.S. courts increasingly are willing to conduct
in camera interviews with children and hear testimony from
psychiatrists during Hague proceedings to assess whether a
relevant defense should preclude mandatory return. This
mechanism appears successful in exposing coercion of the child
by the abducting parent and ascertaining a sincere under-
standing of the child's objections.'
Conversely, the Scottish courts have misconstrued the
construction of article 13. By relating the Child's Objection
defense to the "grave risk of harm" defense and construing the
two defenses as being dependent upon one another (two sepa-
rate defenses which must be analyzed separately),'" the
Scottish courts are imposing a liberal construction of article
13-an interpretation against which the framers of the Con-
vention and the In re S court cautioned. 4" Relying on this
misguided interpretation, the In re Urness court assumed that
it had only two options: It could either send back the younger
child (whose mother would accompany him) while the older
child remained in Scotland alone (which the court concluded
would effect psychological harm on the older child); or the
court could deny the Hague petition and refuse to order both
children's return. However, the court ignored a third possible
option: it could order that both children return to the United
States where the competent court could make a determination
of custody.
Consequently, the Scottish courts' interpretation of the
141. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., In re S, [1993] 2 All E.R. at 691 (discussing the U.N. Conven-
tion, supra note 93).
143. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., In re Urness, 1994 Scots L.T.R. 989 (1993) (Penrose, Lord Ordi-
nary), afftd, 1994 Scots L.T.R. 996 (2d Div. 1993); see discussion supra Part I.C.
145. The English court's construction of article 13 in In re S declared that the
article 13 defenses are distinct and must be established and analyzed separately.




Child's Objection Clause creates great potential for a parent
abductor to petition a court for an analysis of the parties' pa-
rental capabilities and the dangerous risk that parents will
litigate the merits of the underlying custody dispute during the
Hague proceedings. Moreover, the Urness v. Minto court's anal-
ysis supporting the ultimate decision, which refused to order
the children's return,146 potentially undermined the efficacy
of the Convention. In this particular scenario, the court con-
fronted complex legal and social issues which were intricately
interwoven with the ultimate child custody determination. The
evidence adduced indicated that the children suffered severe
emotional trauma and, as the court asserted, the children did
not altogether express their views freely.'47 Certainly, the
proper forum in which to resolve these types of issues pertain-
ing to custody is the child's state of habitual residence."
With the exception of the Scottish court's interpretation in
In re Urness, the Child's Objection Clause has not been the
subject of arbitrary, ethnocentric judicial interpretation and
critics' contentions of abuse are generally unsubstantiated.
Although judicial authorities are increasingly willing to consid-
er the particular facts of each case to determine whether the
child is expressing an uncoerced objection, 49 the consensus
appears to be that if the court concludes that the child's ex-
pressed views are influenced by the abducting parent, or that
the objection to return is based on a wish to remain with the
abducting parent, little or no weight is given to the child's
opinion. 5 ' It is only in extraordinary circumstances that
146. Urness v. Minto, 1994 Scots L.T.R. 996, 1000 (2d Div. 1993).
147. See In re Urness, 1994 Scots L.T.R. 989, 994 (1993) (Penrose, Lord Ordi-
nary). For instance, John maintained that he wished to remain in Scotland in part
because of his close attachments to his mother, stepfather, and half-brother. Id.
Additionally, both children asserted that they wished to maintain minimal contact,
if any, with their father. Indeed, the most detailed opinion John related was his
preference for the Scottish educational system. Id. The court's reliance on John's
testimony to justify its refusal to order John's return amounted to nothing more
than a pretense for ethnocentrism.
148. Article 19 of the Convention expressly prohibits courts from deciding the
merits of the underlying custody dispute when reviewing Hague petitions for the
return of a child. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 19, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at
9, 19 I.L.M. at 1503; see supra note 46.
149. Herring, supra note 2, at 164 (citing In re R, [1992] 2 Faro. 475, 475
(Eng. Faro. Ct. 1991)).
150. Id. at 164-65 (citing Sheikh v. Cahill, 145 Misc. 2d 171, 177, 546 N.Y.S.2d
517, 521-22 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1989)).
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courts accord the child's opinion deference and refuse to order
his or her return.'51 Before deferring to a child's wishes,
courts usually conduct in camera interviews of the child taking
into account information regarding the child's social back-
ground 5 2 and often, the child is examined by an objective
health professional who prepares oral and written reports for
the court.
Further, in light of the restrictive interpretation demand-
ed, absolute elimination of the Child's Objection defense 53
raises consequential issues. For instance, if the abduction oc-
curred prior to a legal custody determination, then the child's
wishes would not have been considered by any tribunal. Even
assuming a custody hearing was held in the child's state of
habitual residence, it does not necessarily follow ipso facto that
the child's views were considered, because not all jurisdictions
accord deference to children's opinions as to residence."
Thus, if a child was abducted from a contracting state whose
municipal laws do not furnish children with the opportunity to
pronounce their wishes during custody determinations, then
elimination of the Child's Objection defense effectively will rob
that child of the opportunity to communicate his or her wishes
in matters which directly affect the child's welfare-a funda-
mental right conferred to all children by the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child. 5
Accordingly, the Child's Objection defense is an indispens-
able feature of the Hague Convention and its complete deletion
may effect profound and devastating consequences on a child
capable of forming a mature view about matters affecting his
or her welfare. A child who is deemed mature should be per-
mitted to make an assessment, based on his or her own experi-
ences, as to where he or she wishes to reside. The exception is
an important asset to all children, not only in countries where
151. Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503, 10,509 (1986); In re S, [1993] 2 All
E.R. 683, 692 (C.A. 1992). Use of the exception is generally permitted only in
clearly meritorious cases and only when the party opposing the child's return
meets the burden of proof. 51 Fed. Reg. 10,509.
152. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
153. The suggestion has been raised. See Shirman, supra note 2, at 219.
154. See Dyer, supra note 1, at 24; William M. Hilton, Handling a Hague Tri-
al, 6 AM. J. FAze. L. 211 (1992).
155. U.N. Convention, supra note 93, art. 12(2), at 8.
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a child under sixteen years is allowed to express an opinion
and, perhaps, determine his or her residence,'56 but also in
jurisdictions where the child's view is stifled because municipal
laws do not accord the child an occasion to speak.
Nevertheless, the clause must be safeguarded from judicial
abuse resulting from the inherent subjectivity of the provi-
sion.'57 A court reviewing a Hague petition for the return of a
child may take several precautions to promote and ensure the
accurate portrayal of the true nature of the child's objections
while simultaneously minimizing the woeful and destructive
effects of bitter custody disputes and abductions. First, because
of the unfortunate and often inevitable potential for brain-
washing and undue influence over the child by the abducting
parent, a child's objection may not be asserted freely. Thus, in
order to avoid thwarting the Convention's return mechanism,
courts should limit invocation of the provision to extraordinary
circumstances. Second, courts must adhere steadfastly to the
strict interpretation contemplated by the drafters. Third, pre-
cautions may be undertaken to prevent the complexities of
coercion from occurring. Most significant are the requirements
that the court utilize sociological reports available from the
Central Authority'58 and balance the child's opinion against
the fear that the abducting parent would brainwash and turn
the child against the left-behind parent who has no opportuni-
ty to exert influence.'59
Fourth, when a child asserts an objection to being re-
turned, an impartial, competent mental health professional or
social worker may conduct a comprehensive psychological,
mental, and emotional evaluation of the child and present oral
or written reports before the court to insure that the child is
able to convey legitimately his or her individual beliefs. 6 ' Al-
so, a tribunal should conduct an independent inquiry 6' to as-
156. See Starr, supra note 49, at 299; see discussion supra Part II.B.1.
157. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
159. See Adair Dyer, Checklist of Issues to be Considered at the Second Meeting
of the Special Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, in INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUC-
TIONS, supra note 1, at 98, 112.
160. See Hilton, supra note 154, at 213. Mr. Hilton is a certified family law
specialist in California, and a recognized expert in the field of interstate and in-
ternational child custody jurisdiction.
161. Conducting an inquiry into the child's objections does not necessarily con-
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certain and verify the true disposition of the child's objections
through an in camera hearing and by explicitly instructing the
child that he or she is not being forced to choose a particular
parent.'62 Moreover, a reviewing court may appoint indepen-
dent counsel for the child to ensure the child's objection is
asserted freely. Of course, the court must always remember
that because the Hague Convention is an emergency measure,
proceedings must be expeditious."6
Finally, when analyzing article 13, it is imperative that
courts recognize that each provision constitutes an indepen-
dent defense, as the English Court of Appeal advised.'"'
Thus, when any article 13 defense is asserted, the party oppos-
ing the child's return must establish the existence and validity
of each exception independent of other claimed defenses. In
turn, the court must distinctly observe and analyze the circum-
stances pertinent to each defense and determine their legitima-
cy. Most significantly, however, courts should not permit non-
custodial parents to transform the Hague proceeding from an
evidentiary hearing into a substantive legal proceeding which
addresses custody issues, such as psychological make-ups,
parental fitness, and life experiences." 5
V. CONCLUSION
The struggle against the abduction of children overseas
"must always be inspired by a desire to protect children and
should be based upon an interpretation of their true inter-
ests.""'66 Contrary to critics' apprehensions of the Child's Ob-
jection defense, the emerging interpretation of the provision
demonstrates that, although judges are willing to afford chil-
stitute an adjudication on the merits of the underlying custody dispute if the child
merely expresses a preference as to which country it wishes to remain in, not
which parent it chooses to live with.
162. By informing the child that he or she is not being asked to choose be-
tween parents, the method of the interview alleviates the framer's concerns dis-
cussed in the Explanatory Report to the Hague Convention. See Perez-Vera, supra
note 3, at 433.
163. Hague Convention, supra note 9, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4, 19 I.L.M. at
1501; P~rez-Vera, supra note 3, at 457-58.
164. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. For an example of the
potential inaccuracy that a liberal interpretation of article 13 may yield, see supra
note 92.
165. Horstmeyer, supra note 1, at 140.
166. PNrez-Vera, supra note 3, at 431.
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dren the opportunity to verbalize their views, the courts infre-
quently invoke the objection as grounds for refusal to return
the child. Through prudent examinations, courts are cautious
to avoid determination of the merits of the underlying custody
dispute and, except in rare circumstances, adhere to the
Convention's rule of compulsory, expeditious return. While
strict interpretation of all article 13 defenses is imperative to
preserve the Convention's aspirations, the availability of the
Child's Objection defense constitutes an essential feature of the
Convention and manifests unique significance to society's most
cherished asset: children.
Rania Nanos

